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INTRODUCTION 
In this “age of statutes,”1 the federal judiciary performs the 
critical role and function of interpreting and applying statutes in 
cases and controversies brought to the courts for adjudication 
and decision.  The courts act within the separation-of-powers 
structure of the United States Constitution,2 a structure 
popularized prior to the nation’s founding by French lawyer and 
political philosopher Baron de Montesquieu.3 
?
† Alumnae Law Center Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. 
J.D., The University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Wilberforce University. The 
author acknowledges and is thankful for the research support provided by the 
Alumnae Law Center donors and the University of Houston Law Foundation. 
1 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 166 (1982). 
2 “All legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,” 
the “executive Power shall be vested in a President,” and the “judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; 
art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1. 
3 See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS: A COMPENDIUM OF THE FIRST 
ENGLISH EDITION (David W. Carrithers ed., 1977). Bruce Ackerman has noted 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s observation that Montesquieu’s account of 
England’s “threefold division of power into legislative, executive and judicial—was a 
fiction invented by him, a fiction which misled Blackstone and Delome.” Bruce 
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Concerned with “the distribution of powers among the three 
coequal [b]ranches,”4 the principle of separation of powers, 
implied in the Constitution’s governmental structure, “left to 
each [branch, the] power to exercise, in some respects, functions 
in their nature executive, legislative and judicial.”5  Under this 
view, “legislatures rather than courts should make law.”6  This 
notion is reflected in the axiom—indeed, the mantra—that courts 
must only interpret and not make law.7  Those who subscribe to 
this make-no-law position believe that courts should only identify 
and implement the legislative mandate and go no further, and 
courts should not “substitute their own policy preferences 
through the creation and application of public values canons for 
the preferences of Congress as articulated in the words and 
history of the statute.”8 
Others reject the idea that judges merely find and announce, 
but do not and should not make, law.  In the view of one jurist, 
this “is a fictitious and even a childish approach.”9  Judge 
Richard Posner has remarked that “[a]ppellate judges are 
occasional legislators”10 and that “judges make up much of the 
law that they are purporting to be merely applying.”11  That 
judges may make law is inevitable and necessary, for it is 
predictable that legislators cannot anticipate all of the 
postenactment issues and questions that will arise with regard to 
?
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1795 n.181 (2007) 
(quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Montesquieu, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
250, 263 (1920)). 
4 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167–68 (1991). 
5 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 84 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
6 Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: 
The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1861 (1998). 
7 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in 
Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744 (1992). 
8 Id. 
9 Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in 
a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 23 (2002). 
10 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 81 (2008) (emphasis omitted). 
11 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 61 (2003); see also 
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“I am not so naive . . . as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 
‘make’ law.”); Erwin N. Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit the Cloth: An Approach to 
Problems in the Federal Courts, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 787, 801 (1983) (“Everyone 
knows that judges do make law, and should make law. It is rather a question of how 
much law they should make.”). 
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2015] FROM GRIGGS TO RICCI 811 
the operative meaning of a statutory provision in specific cases, 
circumstances, and contexts.12  Given this reality, courts will fill 
gaps in statutory text,13 making law in the process. 
This Article focuses on judicial lawmaking and policymaking 
in an important area of antidiscrimination law—Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964’s regulatory regime.14  As enacted in 
1964, Title VII only prohibited intentional employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.15  The statute requires a finding that an 
employer “has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally 
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the 
complaint.”16  “[Such] ‘disparate treatment’ . . . is the most easily 
understood type of discrimination.  The employer simply treats 
some people less favorably than others . . . . Proof of 
discriminatory motive is critical . . . .”17  Thereafter, in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co.,18 the United States Supreme Court held that 
Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”19  
Title VII claims alleging such “ ‘disparate impact’ . . . involve 
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment 
of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group 
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.”  The 
Court held, “Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required 
under a disparate-impact theory.”20 
 
 
 
?
12 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (3d ed. 2012); 1 F.A. HAYEK, 
LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 119 (1973). 
13 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113–14 
(1921) (“He [the judge] legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the 
law. How far he may go without traveling beyond the walls of the interstices cannot 
be staked out for him upon a chart.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The 
Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (1987) (“The national 
legislature expresses itself too often in commands that are unclear, imprecise, or 
gap-ridden . . . .”). 
14 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2014). 
15 See § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
16 § 2000e-5(g)(1). 
17 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
18 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
19 Id. at 431. 
20 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. 
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As discussed in Part I, the Court’s landmark Griggs decision 
is an exemplar of judge-made law, a “judicial rather than a 
legislative creation.”21  The Congress that enacted Title VII in 
1964 did not conceive of or intend to impose Title VII liability for 
the adverse effects of employer practices in the absence of proof 
of an employer’s discriminatory motive.22  Thus, the Griggs 
Court’s expansion of the statute’s scope to cover and prohibit 
certain facially neutral and concededly unintentional employer 
acts created a fundamental public value opposing—and provided 
a cause of action by which plaintiffs could challenge—disparate 
impact in the workplace. 
Griggs was not the first and last stop in the Court’s 
disparate-impact jurisprudence.  As discussed in Part II, in its 
1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,23 the Court 
again made law when it made significant changes in the 
allocation of the evidentiary burdens borne by plaintiffs and 
employers in disparate-impact litigation.24  Two years later, 
Congress responded to the Wards Cove Court’s lawmaking by 
making a law of its own—the Civil Rights Act of 1991, wherein 
Congress codified the disparate-impact cause of action and 
expressly set out the elements of the plaintiff’s claim and an 
employer’s defense thereto.25  Additionally, in its 2009 decision in 
Ricci v. DeStefano,26 the Court, again making law, formulated a 
new and extrastatutory rule governing an employer’s decision to 
discard what the Court believed to be a disparate-impact-causing  
 
?
21 Margaret Thornton, Sexual Harassment Losing Sight of Sex Discrimination, 
26 MELB. U. L. REV. 422, 425 (2002). 
22 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 197 (1992) (“If in 1964 any sponsor of the Civil 
Rights Act had admitted Title VII on the ground that it adopted the disparate 
impact test read into it by the Supreme Court in Griggs, Title VII would have gone 
down to thundering defeat and perhaps brought the rest of the act down with it.”); 
Michael Evan Gold, Griggs’ Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of 
the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a 
Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 432 (1985) (“Congress did not 
intend to outlaw adverse impact; disparate treatment was the Eighty-eighth 
Congress’ only definition of discrimination.”); id. at 481 (“[T]here is overwhelming 
evidence that Congress did not intend to legislate adverse impact . . . .”). 
23 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
24 Id. at 655–57, 659–61. 
25 See infra Part II.B. 
26 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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employment examination.27  The Court’s journey from Griggs to 
Ricci and its repeated judicial lawmaking in this important area 
of antidiscrimination law are the foci of this Article. 
I. GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER CO. 
A. The Case and the Court’s Decision 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,28 the Court, interpreting Title 
VII section 703(a)(2)29: 
We granted the writ in this case to resolve the question whether 
an employer is prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 
VII, from requiring a high school education or passing of a 
standardized general intelligence test as a condition of 
employment in or transfer to jobs when (a) neither standard is 
shown to be significantly related to successful job performance, 
(b) both requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a 
substantially higher rate than white applicants, and (c) the jobs 
in question formerly had been filled only by white employees as 
part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to whites.30 
?
27 Id. at 563; see also discussion infra Part III. 
28 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
29 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West 2014). The provision in question reads: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Id.; see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2507, 2517 (2015) (noting that the Griggs Court “relied solely on [Title VII] 
§ 703(a)(2)”). Note that the Court did not interpret section 703(a)(1), which provides 
that it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
By focusing on section 703(a)(2) rather than section 703(a)(1)’s “standard harmful 
intent doctrine,” civil rights lawyers “sought to exploit the dualism in [s]ection 703 
(a)” and align section 703(a)(2) “with their new doctrine of harmful effects or 
disparate impact.” HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 249–50 (1990). For a discussion 
of the pros and cons of the Court’s interpretation of section 703(a)(2), see ALFRED W. 
BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 102–07 (1993). For an argument that Congress did not 
intend section 703(a)(2) to outlaw disparate impact, see Gold, supra note 22, at 567–
78. 
30 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26. 
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Prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Duke Power overtly discriminated on the basis of 
race in hiring and assigning employees at its Dan River Steam 
Station, a power generating facility located in Draper, North 
Carolina.31  That facility was divided “into five operating 
departments: (1) Labor, (2) Coal Handling, (3) Operations, 
(4) Maintenance, and (5) Laboratory and Test.”32  Until 1966, no 
African American had been employed in any department other 
than the Labor Department.33  That department provided service 
to the other departments and was responsible for janitorial 
services, including mixing mortar, collecting garbage, and 
providing labor needed for the performance of miscellaneous 
jobs.34  Labor Department employees were paid a maximum of 
$1.565 per hour; that wage was less than the minimum of $1.705 
per hour paid to employees in the other operating departments, 
where maximum wages ranged from $3.18 per hour to $3.65 per 
hour.35 
In 1955, the company adopted and implemented a policy 
requiring a high school education for an initial assignment to any 
operating department other than Labor and for transfer from 
Coal Handling to the “inside” Operations, Maintenance, or 
Laboratory Departments.36  The high school education 
requirement was subsequently extended to those seeking 
transfers from Labor to any other department.37  On July 2, 1965, 
Title VII’s effective date, an additional requirement was added 
for new workers seeking placement in any department other than 
the Labor Department: registering satisfactory scores on the 
Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett Mechanical 
Comprehension Test.38  Incumbent employees who did not have a  
 
?
31 Id. at 425. 
32 Id. at 427. 
33 Id. 
34 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d, 401 
U.S. 424. 
35 Id.; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427. 
36 Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1239. 
37 Id. at 1229. “The company claims that this policy was instituted because it 
realized that its business was becoming more complex and that there were some 
employees who were unable to adjust to the increasingly more complicated work 
requirements and thus unable to advance through the company’s lines of 
progression.” Id. 
38 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427–28. 
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high school education or its equivalent could qualify for transfer 
from the Labor or Coal Handling to “inside” jobs by passing the 
aforementioned aptitude tests.39 
African American incumbent employees filed a class action 
against the company, alleging that the at-issue employment 
practices violated Title VII.40  Dismissing the complaint, the 
district court concluded that the “plaintiffs have failed to carry 
the burden of proving that the defendant has intentionally 
discriminated against them on the basis of race or color.”41  On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
determined that the company’s educational and testing 
requirements “did have a genuine business purpose and that the 
company initiated the policy with no intention to discriminate 
against Negro employees who might be hired after the adoption 
of the educational requirement.”42 
By a vote of eight to zero,43 the Court, in an opinion authored 
by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, reversed the Fourth Circuit 
and held that the challenged employment practices were 
prohibited by Title VII.44  The Court determined that the 
“objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from 
the language of the statute.”45  The Court continued, “It was to 
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable 
?
39 See id. at 428 (“The requisite scores used for both initial hiring and transfer 
approximated the national median for high school graduates.”). 
40 Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1227–28. 
41 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 251 (M.D.N.C. 1968), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 420 F.2d 1225, rev’d, 401 U.S. 424. 
42 Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1232. Judge Simon Sobeloff dissented from the majority’s 
opinion upholding the company’s educational and testing requirements: 
The statute is unambiguous. Overt racial discrimination in hiring and 
promotion is banned. So too, the statute interdicts practices that are fair in 
form but discriminatory in substance. . . . The critical inquiry is business 
necessity and if it cannot be shown that an employment practice which 
excludes blacks stems from legitimate needs the practice must end. 
Id. at 1238 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, Judge Sobeloff opined, “Title VII bars ‘freeze-outs’ as well as pure 
discrimination, where the ‘freeze’ is achieved by requirements that are arbitrary and 
have no real business justification.” Id. at 1248. 
43 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not consider or decide the case. See 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436; see also GRAHAM, supra note 29, at 386 (“Justice 
Brennan . . . recused himself from Griggs because he had once represented the Duke 
Power Company . . . .”). 
44 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. 
45 Id. at 429–30. 
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group of white employees over other employees.”46  Facially 
neutral and intent-neutral employment “procedures, or 
tests . . . cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the 
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”47 
Noting that whites registered better on the company’s 
qualification requirements than did African Americans,48 the 
Court opined that, because of their race, the plaintiffs “have long 
received inferior education in segregated schools.”49  The Court 
considered congressional intent: 
Congress did not intend . . . to guarantee a job to every person 
regardless of qualifications.  In short, the Act does not command 
that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the 
subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a 
minority group.  Discriminatory preference for any group, 
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has 
proscribed.50 
In a now well-known passage, the Court made clear that 
“[w]hat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the 
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial 
or other impermissible classification.”51  Congress has mandated 
“that the posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken into 
account” under a statute that “proscribes not only overt 
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation.”52  The Court noted, “The touchstone 
is business necessity.  If an employment practice which operates 
to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.”53  
?
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 430. 
48 Id. at 430 n.6 (“In North Carolina, 1960 census statistics show that, while 
34% of white males had completed high school, only 12% of Negro males had done 
so.”). As for standardized tests, including the Wonderlic and Bennett tests, fifty-
eight percent of whites obtained passing scores as compared to six percent of African 
Americans. See id. 
49 Id. at 430. The Court cited Gaston County v. United States, stating, “There, 
because of the inferior education received by Negroes in North Carolina, this Court 
barred the institution of a literacy test for voter registration on the ground that the 
test would abridge the right to vote indirectly on account of race.” Id. (citing Gaston 
Cnty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 289 (1969)). 
50 Id. at 430–31. 
51 Id. at 431. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
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Turning to the company’s high school completion 
requirement and intelligence test, the Court concluded that 
neither was “shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to 
successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.”54  The 
company, with no preadoption or meaningful study of the 
requirements’ relationship to the ability to perform jobs, relied on 
its judgment that the requirements “generally would improve the 
overall quality of the work force.”55  The Court found it significant 
that employees who had not finished high school or performed 
satisfactorily on the aptitude tests performed satisfactorily and 
progressed in the departments in which they worked:56  “The 
promotion record of present employees who would not be able to 
meet the new criteria thus suggests the possibility that the 
requirements may not be needed even for the limited purpose of 
preserving the avowed policy of advancement within the 
Company.”57 
The Court noted the Fourth Circuit’s holding that in 
adopting the high school diploma and test requirements, the 
company had no “intention to discriminate against Negro 
employees.”58  The absence of discriminatory intent “is suggested 
by special efforts to help the undereducated employees through 
Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition for high 
school training.”59  The Court did not suggest that this no-
discriminatory-intent finding was erroneous:   
[B]ut good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does 
not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that 
operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are 
unrelated to measuring job capability. 
. . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences 
of employment practices, not simply the motivation.  More than 
that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of 
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question.60 
?
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 431–32. 
57 Id. at 432. 
58 Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970), 
rev’d, 401 U.S. 424) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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In the final pages of its opinion, the Court considered and 
rejected the company’s contention that its intelligence tests were 
permitted by section 703(h) of Title VII.61  Noting the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s Guidelines interpreting 
section 703(h),62 the Court determined that the “administrative 
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to 
great deference” and that the EEOC’s construction, supported by 
the statute and its legislative history, “affords good reason to 
treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.”63  
Congress has prohibited giving testing “devices and mechanisms 
controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable 
measure of job performance” and “has commanded . . . that any 
tests used must measure the person for the job and not the 
person in the abstract.”64 
An act of judicial lawmaking, Griggs created a cause of 
action not expressly provided by Title VII as originally enacted.65  
The Court “bridge[d] the gap between the egalitarian ideals 
expressed in the law books and the everyday realities of the job 
market.”66  Instead of asking whether the company intentionally 
discriminated against African American employees, the Court 
asked whether the company’s practices constituted “artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment”67 resulting 
in a disparate impact not justified by business necessity.68  To be 
sure, the Court’s focus on and interpretation of section 703(a)(2), 
and its references to congressional objectives and direction, gives 
the impression of a Court engaged in finding and not making 
?
61 Id. at 433–36 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h) (West 2014) (“[N]or shall it be 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results 
of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its 
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to 
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”)). 
62 See id. at 433 & n.9 (quoting EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing 
Procedures (Aug 24, 1966); Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 35 Fed. 
Reg. 12,333 (Aug. 1, 1970) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1607 (1978))). 
63 Id. at 433–34. 
64 Id. at 436. 
65 See Lewis v. City of Chi., 560 U.S. 205, 211 (2010) (“As originally enacted, 
Title VII did not expressly prohibit employment practices that cause a disparate 
impact.”). 
66 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 185–86 
(2014). 
67 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
68 See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
112 (2014). 
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law.  That impression is illusory, however, as the Court’s 
employee-protective opinion and analysis gave primacy of place 
to addressing the consequences of employment actions and is the 
judicial work product of a Court unwilling to turn a blind eye to 
the freezing and lock-in effects of prior discriminatory 
employment practices.  The Griggs Court went where the 1964 
Congress did not go; the Court made law.69 
B. Post-Griggs Rulings 
Court decisions issued in the years following Griggs gave 
further shape and content to disparate-impact law and doctrine.  
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,70 the Court held that an 
employer’s validation study assessing the job relatedness of 
employment tests was materially defective.71  The Court noted 
that once a plaintiff or class makes out a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the employer bears the “burden of proving that 
its tests are ‘job related.’ ”72  If the employer meets that burden, 
the plaintiff could still “show that other tests or selection devices, 
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the 
employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy 
workmanship.’ ”73  Finding several flaws in the employer’s test 
validation efforts,74 the Court remanded the case to the district 
court for further proceedings.75 
Dothard v. Rawlinson76 addressed a plaintiff’s disparate-
impact action challenging facially neutral minimum weight and 
height requirements for all law enforcement officers established 
by an Alabama statute.77  The plaintiff, who sought employment 
as a correctional counselor with the Alabama Board of 
Corrections, convinced a three-judge district court that the 
weight and height requirements constituted arbitrary barriers to 
?
69 For the argument that Griggs’ interpretation of Title VII is not legitimate and 
disparate-impact liability is “a rule without reason,” see Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2526, 2531 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
70 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
71 Id. at 431, 435–36. 
72 Id. at 425. 
73 Id.  
74 See id. at 431–36. 
75 Id. at 436. 
76 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
77 See id. at 323–24, 324 n.2. The minimum weight requirement was 120 
pounds, and the minimum height requirement was five feet two inches. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 216 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 216 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_TURNER 3/29/2016  4:30 PM 
820 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:809   
employment opportunities that Title VII prohibited.78  Guided by 
Griggs and Albemarle Paper, the Supreme Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Potter Stewart, concluded that the plaintiffs 
established a prima facie case as evidenced by the percentages of 
women excluded from work opportunities due to the weight and 
height requirements, considered separately and jointly.79  
Finding that the standards had a discriminatory impact on 
female applicants, the Court turned to the employer’s argument 
that the requirements were job related.80  The employer had the 
burden of showing that the requirements had “a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question.”81  According to the 
employer, the requirements had a relationship to strength 
essential to effective performance of the job of correctional 
counselor.82  But the employer produced no evidence correlating 
the requirements with a requisite amount of job-related 
strength.83  Additionally, the Court opined, if strength was a bona 
fide job-related quality, the employer could have adopted and 
validated a test directly measuring the strength of applicants.84 
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,85 the question 
before the Court was whether a transit authority’s regulation 
prohibiting the employment of users of narcotics, including 
former heroin addicts receiving methadone treatment, violated 
Title VII.  The Court, per Justice John Paul Stevens, determined 
that the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence did not establish a prima 
facie violation of Title VII.86  Assuming that a prima facie case 
?
78 Id. at 323, 328. 
79 See id. at 329–30. The Court noted the district court’s determination that the 
minimum height requirement would exclude 33.29% of women in the United States 
between the ages of eighteen and seventy-nine and only 1.28% of men in that age 
range. The weight requirement would exclude 22.29% of women and 2.35% of men in 
that age group, and the height and weight requirements combined would exclude 
41.13% of women and less than 1% of men. See id. 
80 Id. at 331. 
81 Id. at 329 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1974)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
82 Id. at 331. 
83 Id. 
84 See id. at 332. 
85 440 U.S. 568, 570–71 (1979). 
86 See id. at 583–84. The Court concluded that a statistic regarding the number 
of employees referred to the employer’s medical director for suspected violations of 
the narcotics rule “tells us nothing about the racial composition of the employees 
suspected of using methadone,” and noted that the record did not contain 
information about the number of African American, Latino, or white employees 
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had been established, the Court concluded that it was rebutted 
by the employer’s demonstration that the narcotics rule was job 
related.87  The employer’s “legitimate employment goals of safety 
and efficiency require the exclusion of all users of illegal 
narcotics, barbiturates, and amphetamines, and of a majority of 
all methadone users,” as well as the exclusion of all methadone 
users from “safety sensitive” positions.88  Accordingly, the 
challenged rule bore a “manifest relationship to the employment 
in question.”89 
Consider Connecticut v. Teal,90 wherein the Court, by a five-
to-four vote, held that an employer’s “bottom line” result in a 
promotion process did not preclude lawsuits alleging racial 
discrimination effected by an examination that had a disparate 
impact on African-American employees.91  Writing for the Court, 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. noted that Griggs and its progeny 
established a three-part analysis of disparate-impact claims: 
(1) the plaintiff ’s prima facie case, (2) the employer’s 
demonstration that the requirement has a manifest relationship 
to the employment in question, and (3) the plaintiff ’s showing 
that the employer’s use of the practice was a pretext for 
discrimination.92 
The results of the at-issue examination revealed that 54.2% 
of African-American candidates, but not the four  
African-American plaintiffs, passed the exam.93  As that number 
was approximately sixty-eight percent of the pass rate for white 
candidates, the exam resulted in disparate impact under the 
EEOC’s “eighty percent rule.”94 
?
dismissed for using methadone. See id. at 584–85. While the district court noted that 
approximately sixty-three percent of persons receiving methadone maintenance in 
New York City public programs were African Americans or Latinos, it was not 
known “how many of these persons ever worked or sought to work for” the employer. 
Id. at 585–86 (discussing other problems with the statistical evidence). 
87 Id. at 587. 
88 Id. at 587 n.31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
89 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
91 Id. at 442–43 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
92 See id. at 446–47. 
93 Id. at 443. 
94 Id. at 443 n.4 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1981)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The eighty percent rule provides that a selection rate that “is less 
than [eighty percent] . . . of the rate for the group with the highest rate will 
generally be regarded . . . as evidence of adverse impact.” 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D). 
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The employer asked the Court to recognize an exception for 
cases in which an employer hires or promotes a sufficient number 
of African-American employees in response to and as 
compensation for a discriminatory test.95  The Court answered in 
the negative.96  The suggestion of a “bottom line” defense to a 
discrimination claim brought by an individual employee 
“confuse[s] unlawful discrimination with discriminatory intent.”97  
While an employer’s good-faith effort to achieve a 
nondiscriminatory work force can in some instances rebut an 
inference of intentional discrimination, “resolution of the factual 
question of intent is not what is at issue in this case.”98  “It is 
clear that Congress never intended to give an employer license to 
discriminate against some employees on the basis of race or sex 
merely because he favorably treats other members of the 
employees’ group.”99  Title VII protects individual employees from 
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination; “[t]he 
principal focus of the statute is the protection of the individual 
employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a 
whole.”100 
From the foregoing discussion, one can glean the elements of 
a disparate-impact methodology in which plaintiffs’ and 
employers’ required showings were clearly defined.  With regard 
to the employer’s burden, the Court’s jurisprudence made clear 
that the employer had to prove that a challenged employment 
practice was job related and had a manifest relationship to the 
employment in question.  Failure to satisfy that burden was fatal 
to the employer’s defense. 
 
?
95 Id. at 452–53. 
96 Id. at 453. 
97 Id. at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 455. 
100 Id. at 453–54. A dissenting Justice Lewis F. Powell, joined by Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger and Justices William H. Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor, 
argued that there cannot be a disparate-impact violation absent evidence of 
disparate impact on a group. See id. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell 
also expressed his discontent and predicted that the “practical effect of today’s 
decision may well be the adoption of simple quota hiring.” Id. at 463. 
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II. FROM WARDS COVE TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 
The Griggs disparate-impact theory was and remains 
controversial.  Under that theory, an employer can violate Title 
VII even in the absence of evidence that the employer 
intentionally discriminated on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.  The analysis “requires employers to 
reconsider policies adopted for legitimate reasons, but with little 
thought to their effect on workforce diversity.”101  This 
requirement has been criticized: 
Conservatives object that this unduly burdens innocent 
employers.  It involves the courts and regulatory agencies in the 
intricacies of businesses and enterprises with which they have 
little familiarity.  The employer is best suited to determine 
whether or not a test or selection practice is job related, they 
complain—not judges or government bureaucrats.  Free-market 
incentives amply punish employers who select employees 
irrationally.  Judicial intermeddling and bureaucratic 
micromanaging waste the resources of employers, who must 
navigate a maze of regulations to defend innocent selection 
practices.  Worst of all, the harried employer, faced with the 
threat of liability, may insulate itself by adopting quota hiring 
so as to avoid disparate impact altogether, rather than face the 
costly and daunting task of defending its practices.102   
Resistance to Griggs became official government policy with 
the 1981 election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency.  “A major 
objective of the Reagan administration’s civil rights agenda was 
getting rid of the Griggs disparate impact theory and enshrining 
forever in our civil rights laws and jurisprudence the proposition 
that our commitment to equality prohibits only disparate 
treatment or intentional discrimination.”103 
The administration’s Solicitor General, Charles Fried, 
believed that Griggs “had greatly expanded the exposure of 
employers to Title VII lawsuits by minority workers” and 
subjected “to ruinous liability” employers who could not explain 
?
101 RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE 
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 117 (2011). 
102 Id. 
103 ROBERT BELTON, THE CRUSADE FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: THE 
GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER STORY 278 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 2014). The late Professor 
Belton was one of the legal strategists in the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund’s civil rights litigation campaign for workplace justice, out of which Griggs 
arose. 
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“to a court’s or bureaucrat’s satisfaction” how a challenged 
practice was justified by business necessity.104  “[M]any 
employers, federal enforcement officials, and lower courts 
understood Griggs as a mandate for quota hiring.”105  Fried 
“concentrated on . . . taming Griggs, with its pressure toward 
quotas,”106 and saw the opportunity to do just that in Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio.107 
A. The Wards Cove Decision 
In Wards Cove, the Court considered a disparate impact 
action brought by a class of nonwhite salmon cannery workers 
against two employers operating salmon canneries in Alaska.108  
Unskilled “cannery jobs” on the cannery line were filled 
predominantly by Filipinos and Alaska Natives, and skilled 
“noncannery jobs” were filled with predominantly white 
employees hired from the employers’ offices in Washington and 
Oregon.109  The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the 
employers’ hiring and promotion practices “were responsible for 
the racial stratification of the work force and had denied them 
and other nonwhites employment as noncannery workers on the 
?
104 CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A 
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 93, 94 (1991); see also Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 694 (2011) (“Disparate impact lawsuits also carry too 
great a risk of unjustified liability. . . . Given the legal uncertainties and practical 
difficulties . . . , employers run a significant risk of being found liable regardless of 
whether their methods [were] valid . . . .”). 
105 FRIED, supra note 106, at 95. 
106 Id. at 119. Note that Title VII section 703(j) provides: 
Nothing contained in this subchapter . . . require[s] any employer . . . to 
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of 
the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group 
on account of an imbalance . . . in comparison with the total number or 
percentage of [such] persons . . . in any community, State, section, or other 
area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or 
other area . . . . 
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(j) (West 2014). One commentator has argued that section 
703(j) “should have killed adverse impact aborning.” Gold, supra note 22, at 510. 
107 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
108 See id. at 646–47. 
109 See id. at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted). Cannery workers and 
noncannery employees lived in separate dormitories and ate in separate mess halls. 
See id. 
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basis of race.”110  The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claims.111  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had made out 
a prima facie case of disparate impact in hiring and that the 
employers bore the burden of proving that any disparate impact 
caused by their hiring practices was justified by business 
necessity.112 
The Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, reversed the 
Ninth Circuit.113  Writing for the majority, Justice Byron 
Raymond White, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony 
M. Kennedy, reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the 
plaintiffs’ prima facie case was established by a comparison of 
the percentage of nonwhite cannery workers and the percentage 
of nonwhite noncannery workers.114  Noting that the proper 
comparison in a disparate-impact case is “between the racial 
composition of the qualified persons in the labor market and the 
persons holding at-issue jobs,”115 Justice White determined that 
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was flawed.  “[W]ith respect to the 
skilled noncannery jobs at issue here, the cannery work force in 
no way reflected ‘the pool of qualified job applicants’ or the 
‘qualified population in the labor force.’ ”116  He thus concluded 
that “comparing the number of nonwhites 
occupying . . . [noncannery] jobs to the number of nonwhites 
filling cannery worker positions is nonsensical.”117 
Additionally, Justice White opined that the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach could not be squared with the Court’s precedents or the 
goals of Title VII118:   
[The Ninth Circuit’s] theory . . . would mean that any employer 
who had a segment of his work force that was—for some 
reason—racially imbalanced, could be haled into court and 
?
110 Id. at 647–48. The employment practices challenged by the plaintiffs 
included “nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, separate 
hiring channels, [and] a practice of not promoting from within.” Id. at 647. 
111 Id. at 648. 
112 See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439, 444–45, 450 (9th Cir. 
1987), rev’d, 490 U.S. 642. 
113 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 644, 650. 
114 Id. at 644–45, 649–50. 
115 Id. at 650. 
116 Id. at 651.  
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 652. 
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forced to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of 
defending the “business necessity” of the methods used to select 
the other members of his work force.  The only practicable 
option for many employers would be to adopt racial quotas, 
insuring that no portion of their work forces deviated in racial 
composition from the other portions thereof; this is a result that 
Congress expressly rejected in drafting Title VII.119 
Furthermore, Justice White continued, “Racial imbalance in 
one segment of an employer’s work force does not, without more, 
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect to 
the selection of workers for the employer’s other positions.”120  
Absent barriers or practices deterring qualified nonwhite 
workers from applying for noncannery jobs, “if the percentage of 
selected applicants who are nonwhite is not significantly less 
than the percentage of qualified applicants who are nonwhite, 
the employer’s selection mechanism probably does not operate 
with a disparate impact on minorities.”121 
Having reversed the Ninth Circuit, the Court remanded the 
case for further proceedings on the question of whether the 
plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.122  Justice White addressed the issue of disparate-impact 
causation, relying on and quoting Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust: 
[W]e note that the plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima 
facie case goes beyond the need to show that there are 
statistical disparities in the employer’s work force.  The plaintiff 
must begin by identifying the specific employment practice that 
is challenged . . . . Especially in cases where an employer 
combines subjective criteria with the use of more rigid 
standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in our view 
responsible for isolating and identifying the specific 
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any 
observed statistical disparities.123 
?
119 Id. (citing Title VII § 703(j), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(j) (West 2014)). 
120 Id. at 653. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 649. 
123 Id. at 656 (alterations in original) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Justice Kennedy, who did not participate in Watson, provided the fifth and 
majority-creating vote in Wards Cove. 
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On remand, the plaintiffs would have to specifically show “that 
each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on 
employment opportunities for whites and nonwhites” and “to 
hold otherwise would result in employers being potentially liable 
for ‘the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical 
imbalances in the composition of their work forces.’ ”124 
The showing of a prima facie case would shift the focus of the 
case to “any business justification” an employer offers for using 
the challenged practice.125  “The touchstone of this inquiry is a 
reasoned review of the employer’s justification for his use of the 
challenged practice.”126  The employer “carries the burden of 
producing evidence of a business justification for his employment 
practice” and that practice need not be “essential” or 
“indispensable” to the business.127  Justice White made clear that 
this approach conformed to the rule governing disparate-
treatment cases in which “the plaintiff bears the burden of 
disproving an employer’s assertion that the adverse employment 
action or practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral 
consideration.”128  This importation of disparate-treatment 
?
124 Id. at 657 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 992). A dissenting Justice Stevens 
argued that “[t]his additional proof requirement is unwarranted.” Id. at 672 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]n a disparate-impact case, proof of numerous 
questionable employment practices ought to fortify an employee’s assertion that the 
practices caused racial disparities. Ordinary principles of fairness require that Title 
VII actions be tried like ‘any lawsuit.’ The changes the majority makes today, 
tipping the scales in favor of employers, are not faithful to those principles.”). Id. at 
673 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (citing U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983)). 
125 See id. at 658 (majority opinion). 
126 Id. at 659. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 660. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the 
Court took up the issue of the order and allocation of proof in a Title VII intentional 
discrimination case. The Court stated that the plaintiff “must carry the initial 
burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.” 
411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff makes that showing, the “burden then must shift to 
the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employee’s rejection.” Id. If the employer’s articulated reason meets the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case, the plaintiff must “be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the 
employer’s] stated reason . . . was in fact pretext.” Id. at 804. In a subsequent case, 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Court 
addressed again the evidentiary burdens placed on employers defending Title VII 
disparate-treatment actions. The Court noted that the ultimate burden of 
persuading the factfinder that the employer discriminated remains with the plaintiff 
throughout the litigation. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. The plaintiff’s establishment of 
a prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer has engaged in unlawful 
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methodology into disparate-impact analysis relieved the 
employer of its Griggs-mandated burden of proving the job 
relatedness and business necessity of its challenged practices.  In 
an incredible passage, Justice White stated: 
We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read 
as suggesting otherwise.  But to the extent that those cases 
speak of an employers’ “burden of proof” with respect to a 
legitimate business justification defense, they should have been 
understood to mean an employer’s production—but not 
persuasion—burden.129 
The Court thus made a huge change in disparate-impact doctrine 
while denying that it was doing any such thing. 
Finally, Justice White instructed, plaintiffs unable to carry 
their burden of persuasion on the question of the employer’s 
business justification could still prevail by persuading the 
factfinder that other tests or selection devices would serve the 
employer’s legitimate interests without the undesirable racial 
effect.130  The alternative practice “must be equally effective as 
[the employer’s] chosen hiring procedures in achieving [the 
employer’s] legitimate employment goals.”131  Meeting that 
burden would establish that the employer’s use of the challenged 
practice was a pretext for discrimination.132 
?
conduct. Id. at 254. The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut that 
presumption by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
action. Id. The employer “need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated 
by the proffered reasons.” Id. Where that burden of production is met, the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case is rebutted and the plaintiff must then prove pretext, that is, prove 
that “the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This 
burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has 
been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 256. For more recent Court 
decisions addressing the shifting burdens of proof in disparate-treatment cases, see 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor 
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
129 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660 (citations omitted) (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 
1006–08 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Transp. Mgmt. 
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 n.7 (1983)). 
130 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660. 
131 Id. at 661. “Factors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative 
selection devices are relevant in determining whether they would be equally as 
effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer’s legitimate business 
goals.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (plurality opinion)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
132 Id. at 660. 
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Four Justices dissented.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun, joined 
by Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, argued that the 
majority had “upset[] the longstanding distribution of burdens of 
proof in Title VII disparate-impact cases.”133  “One wonders 
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination—or, 
more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites—is a 
problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.”134 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, stated, “I cannot join this latest sojourn into judicial 
activism.”135  Griggs made clear that in disparate-impact cases 
“[t]he touchstone is business necessity” and that “Congress has 
placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given 
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the 
employment in question.”136  The employer’s disparate-impact 
burden “is proof of an affirmative defense of business necessity” 
and not “simply one of coming forward with evidence of 
legitimate business purpose.”137  Responding to Justice White’s 
declaration that precedent “should have been understood to mean 
an employer’s . . . burden,”138 Justice Stevens opined that he was 
“astonished to read that the touchstone of this inquiry is a 
reasoned review of the employer’s justification for his use of the 
challenged practice.”139  He also noted, “[T]here is no requirement 
that the . . . practice be . . . ‘essential.’ ”140  “This casual—almost 
summary—rejection of the statutory construction that developed 
in the wake of Griggs is most disturbing.”141  In his view, Griggs 
“correctly reflected the intent of the Congress that enacted Title 
VII” and, even if it did not, he “could not join a rejection of a 
consistent interpretation of a federal statute”142  Justice Stevens 
also noted, “Congress frequently revisits this statutory scheme 
and can readily correct [the Court’s] mistakes if [the Court] 
misread[s] [Congress’s] meaning.”143 
?
133 Id. at 661 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
134 Id. at 662. 
135 Id. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
136 Id. at 665–66 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 
(1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
137 Id. at 668. 
138 Id. at 660 (majority opinion). 
139 Id. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
140 Id. (alterations in original). 
141 Id. at 671–72. 
142 Id. at 672. 
143 Id. 
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That Wards Cove is an exemplar of judicial lawmaking 
cannot be denied.  Eighteen years of Griggs’ Court-created 
regulatory regime did not stop the employer-protective Wards 
Cove Court from changing settled law.  At the prima facie case 
stage of disparate-impact litigation, the Court introduced a 
“ ‘cumulation’ principle”144 and announced that plaintiffs would 
henceforth have to specifically identify and isolate the particular 
employment practice that caused the disparate impact.  “This 
ruling posed a substantial proof problem for the plaintiffs in 
cases in which employers rely upon a group of interrelated 
practices in making employment decisions.”145  Moreover, and 
significantly, the Court jettisoned the employer’s burden of 
proving that a challenged practice was job related and essential, 
replacing it with a business justification standard subject to a 
lesser burden-of-production requirement.  While the structure of 
Griggs was left standing, the foundations of the Court’s 1971 
decision had been weakened. 
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
Congress responded to Wards Cove in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.146  One of the stated purposes of the act was “to codify the 
concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the 
Supreme Court” in Griggs “and in the other Supreme Court 
decisions prior to” Wards Cove.147  The act amended Title VII 
section 703 by adding subsection (k).148 
As amended, Title VII provides the framework for 
establishing the occurrence of an unlawful employment practice: 
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is 
established . . . [when] a complaining party demonstrates that a 
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a 
?
144 See BELTON, supra note 105, at 311. 
145 Id. at 310. 
146 See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections 
of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). This legislation responded to the Court’s decisions in Wards 
Cove, 490 U.S. 642, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 
754 (1989), Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), Lorance v. AT&T Technologies., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 
(1989), and Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). For a discussion of the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act and its impact on employment discrimination litigation, see Michael 
Selmi, The Supreme Court’s Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 281 (2011). 
147 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071. 
148 Id. 
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disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity . . . .149 
To demonstrate that a particular practice causes a disparate 
impact, “the complaining party shall demonstrate that each 
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate 
impact.”150  This demonstration is not required where the 
“complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the 
elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking [sic] process are not 
capable of separation for analysis”; where that showing is made, 
“the decisionmaking [sic] process may be analyzed as one 
employment practice.”151 
Section 703(k) provides, further, that a complaining party 
can establish disparate impact through “an alternative 
employment practice” which the employer refuses to adopt.152  
That demonstration “shall be in accordance with the law as it 
existed on June 4, 1989, [the day before the decision in Wards 
Cove,] with respect to the concept of ‘alternative employment 
practice.’ ”153 
In codifying the disparate-impact cause of action, Congress 
left in place the Wards Cove cumulation principle while providing 
a complaining party with the opportunity of showing that an 
employer’s decision-making process should be analyzed as one 
employment practice.  Congress rejected and legislatively 
overruled Wards Cove’s business justification standard and 
reinstated the Griggs burden-of-persuasion rule governing an 
employer’s job-relatedness and business necessity defense.154  As 
the Court recently noted, “Unless and until the defendant pleads 
and proves a business-necessity defense, the plaintiff wins simply 
by showing” the “essential ingredients of a disparate-impact 
claim.”155 
?
149 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West 2014). “The term ‘demonstrates’ 
means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.” § 2000e(m). 
150 § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). 
151 Id. 
152 § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
153 § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C). 
154 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
155 Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 213 (2010). 
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III. RICCI V. DESTEFANO 
In Ricci v. DeStefano,156 New Haven, Connecticut firefighters 
seeking to qualify for promotion to the rank of lieutenant or 
captain took examinations given by the city.157  The results of the 
examinations revealed that white candidates received higher 
scores than minority candidates.158  The city, “faced with a prima 
facie case of disparate-impact liability,”159 threw out the test and 
made no promotions.160  White firefighters and one Latino 
firefighter,161 alleging that they likely would have been promoted 
under the discarded test,162 sued the city and claimed that they 
had been subjected to intentional disparate-treatment 
discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII.163  
?
156 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
157 Id. at 564. The city’s contract with the New Haven firefighters’ union 
required applicants for lieutenant and captain positions to take written and oral 
examinations. See id. The written exam accounted for sixty percent of the applicant’s 
total score, with the oral exam accounting for forty percent of that score. See id. 
158 Id. at 562. 
159 Id. at 586. The Court’s prima facie case determination was based on the 
following: 
The racial impact here was significant . . . . On the captain exam, the pass 
rate for white candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent for both 
black and Hispanic candidates. On the lieutenant exam, the pass rate for 
white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and 
for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent. 
Id. The minority pass rates “fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the 
EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.” Id. 
160 See id. at 574. Voting on a motion to certify the examination results, the 
city’s civil service board, with one member recused, deadlocked two-to-two, resulting 
in a decision not to certify the results. See id. 
161 Richard Primus notes that published reports referred to the Ricci plaintiffs 
as a group of nineteen white firefighters and one Latino firefighter. “That said, 
‘Latino’ and ‘white’ are not mutually exclusive categories, and according to published 
reports [Lieutenant Benjamin] Vargas [fell] into both categories.” Richard Primus, 
The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1342 n.4 (2010). 
162 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562–63. 
163 The plaintiffs also alleged that the city violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”). The Court did not decide the equal protection 
question. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563. A concurring Justice Scalia stated that the 
Court’s resolution of the case on statutory grounds “merely postpones the evil day on 
which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are 
the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII . . . consistent with the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection.” Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). He argued, “Title 
VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring 
employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions 
based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking [sic] 
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The city argued that discarding the test results was necessary to 
avoid exposure to liability in any disparate-impact suit brought 
by the minority firefighters.164 
By a five-to-four vote, the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Kennedy, concluded that “race-based action like the City’s in this 
case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can 
demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the 
action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact 
statute.”165  Finding no genuine dispute that the city did not have 
the requisite strong basis in evidence, Justice Kennedy 
determined that the plaintiffs’ Title VII rights had been 
violated.166 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis rested on a questionable and 
contestable premise:  “The City’s actions would violate the 
disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid 
defense.  All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to 
certify the examination results because of the statistical 
disparity based on race—i.e., how minority candidates had 
performed when compared to white candidates.”167  Having 
characterized the city’s actions as race-based,168 he concluded,  
?
is . . . discriminatory.” Id. For more on this issue, see Richard A. Primus, Equal 
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003). 
164 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 579. 
168 Interestingly, and as noted by Justin Driver, Justice Kennedy’s concern 
about the city’s race-conscious conduct is set forth in an opinion in which the Justice 
himself considers race. See Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
404, 407 (2012). Justice Kennedy recounted the testimony of three witnesses who 
spoke to the city’s civil service board about their views on testing and New Haven’s 
promotion examinations. Justice Kennedy wrote that Vincent Lewis, a witness who 
looked at the exam and concluded that candidates should know the tested material, 
“is black”; he did not identify the race of the other two witnesses. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 
570–71. Driver observes comments on this omission: 
This identification is striking because, in a decision that cautions against 
the dangers of racially disparate treatment, it treats Lewis disparately by 
race. Ricci’s disclosure that Lewis is black suggests that his race carries 
unusual significance, and that it is germane to the case in a way that the 
other two witnesses’ racial identities are not. 
Driver, supra note 169. For Driver, the “most compelling interpretation” of the 
communication of Lewis’s race “understands Lewis’s blackness to support the notion 
that New Haven’s exam was nondiscriminatory.” Id. Driver notes that another 
witness who distrusted the exam identified herself as black but was not so identified 
by Justice Kennedy; thus, “Justice Kennedy’s opinion—perhaps unwittingly—
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“The City rejected the test results solely because the higher 
scoring candidates were white” and invalidated the firefighters’ 
efforts “in sole reliance upon race-based statistics.”169  On that 
view, the case before the Court did not involve an employer’s 
“well intentioned or benevolent” efforts to comply with Title VII’s 
disparate-impact provision, but rather involved the action of an 
employer who “made its employment decision because of race.”170 
Dividing Title VII into separate and, in his view, conflicting 
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact prohibitions, Justice 
Kennedy embarked on a search for a standard which would give 
effect to Title VII’s prohibition of both intentional and 
unintentional discrimination.  He found that standard—the 
“strong basis in evidence” standard—in race-conscious 
affirmative action cases interpreting and applying the Equal 
Protection Clause.171  As Justice Kennedy noted, those cases held 
that certain race-conscious government actions remedying past 
racial discrimination “are constitutional only where there is a 
‘strong basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were 
necessary.”172  “Applying the strong-basis-in-evidence standard to 
Title VII gives effect to both the disparate-treatment and 
disparate-impact provisions, allowing violations of one in the 
name of compliance with the other only in certain, narrow 
circumstances. . . . And the standard appropriately constrains 
employers’ discretion in making race-based decisions . . . .”173 
Justice Kennedy’s importation of equal protection analysis 
into Title VII effectively substituted the strong-basis-in-evidence 
standard for the business-necessity defense mandated by the 
statute.  Explaining the reason for this move, he stated: 
Had the Court mechanically applied Title VII’s burdens of proof, 
it would have been forced to conclude that the potential 
disparate impact claim against the city would have succeeded: 
?
highlighted an expert’s blackness who supported the examination, but rendered 
raceless a black expert who cast doubt on it.” Id. at 408. 
169 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580, 584. 
170 Id. at 579–80. 
171 Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening 
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 82 (2010) (internal 
quotation mark omitted) Ricci imposes “on employers a standard imported” from 
equal protection review “to constrain employers from taking ‘race-based action’ to 
avoid disparate impact liability.” Id. 
172 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 500 (1989)). 
173 Id. at 583. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 224 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 224 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_TURNER 3/29/2016  4:30 PM 
2015] FROM GRIGGS TO RICCI 835 
there was a statistically disparate impact, and the city would 
clearly not satisfy its burden to show business necessity if its 
position was that the tests were not necessary. . . . The 
language of Title VII makes business necessity an affirmative 
defense, so the Court’s analysis required some unacknowledged 
surgery on the United States Code.174 
Empathy and sympathy for the Ricci plaintiffs were also on 
display in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.175  He noted statements 
from Frank Ricci, one of the plaintiff-firefighters. 
Ricci stated that he had “several learning disabilities,” 
including dyslexia; that he had spent more than $1,000 to 
purchase the materials and pay his neighbor to read them on 
tape so he could “give it [his] best shot”; and that he had studied 
“8 to 13 hours a day to prepare” for the test.176 
Examinations like those given by the city “create legitimate 
expectations on the part of those who took the tests” and “some of 
the firefighters here invested substantial time, money, and 
personal commitment in preparing for the tests,”177 making the 
city’s “reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the 
?
174 Primus, supra note 162, at 1368 (footnote omitted). 
175 Interestingly, President Barack Obama, speaking after Justice David H. 
Souter announced his retirement from the Court and prior to his nomination of 
Sonia Sotomayor as Souter’s replacement, declared that the “quality of empathy, of 
understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and struggles” was “an essential 
ingredient” for Souter’s replacement. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Say It With Feeling? 
Not This Time Around, N.Y TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A15 (internal quotation mark 
omitted). For Senator Orrin Hatch, a Republican from Utah, empathy was “a code 
word for an activist judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). During the 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on her nomination to the Court, Sotomayor 
repudiated the notion of empathy-based judging. See Peter Baker & Charlie Savage, 
Groundwork for Next Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at A1. The Ricci case was 
mentioned during Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings. Then-Judge Sotomayor was a 
member of the Second Circuit panel affirming the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for New Haven. In a per curiam opinion the court stated: 
We are not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs’ expression of frustration. Mr. 
Ricci, for example, who is dyslexic, made intensive efforts that appear to 
have resulted in his scoring highly on one of the exams, only to have it 
invalidated. But it simply does not follow that he has a viable Title VII 
claim. 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev’d, 557 U.S. 557 
(2009). Frank Ricci appeared before the Judiciary Committee and expressed his view 
that Judge Sotomayor had discriminated and ruled against him because he is white. 
See Robin Abcarian et al., Conservatives Say It’s Their Turn for Empowerment, L.A. 
TIMES, Sep. 17, 2009, at A1. 
176 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 567–68 (alteration in original). 
177 Id. at 583–84. 
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process . . . all the more severe.”178  Of course, employees also 
have a legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of a 
flawed test.179 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by Justices 
John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, 
found problematic several aspects of Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion, an opinion that did not include “important parts of the 
story.”180  “Firefighting is a profession in which the legacy of 
racial discrimination casts an especially long shadow.”181  In the 
early 1970s, African Americans and Latinos made up 30% of New 
Haven’s population but only 3.6% of the city’s 502 firefighters.182  
A lawsuit filed against and a settlement agreement entered into 
by the city “produced some positive change”:  In 2003, thirty 
percent of the city’s firefighters were African American and 
sixteen percent were Latino.183  The fire department’s senior 
officer ranks were nine percent African American and nine 
percent Latino, and one of the department’s twenty-one captains 
was African American.184  “It is against this backdrop of 
entrenched inequality that the promotion process at issue in this 
litigation should be assessed.”185 
Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg saw not “even a 
hint of ‘conflict’ between an employer’s obligations under [Title 
VII’s] disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions,”186 
viewing those provisions as complementary.  She also questioned 
the Court’s turn to constitutional law for an evidentiary 
standard, noting that the Court has held that the Equal 
Protection Clause “prohibits only intentional discrimination; it 
does not have a disparate-impact component.”187  Justice 
Ginsburg argued, further, that employers who reject selection 
?
178 Id. at 593. 
179 “The legitimacy of an employee’s expectation depends on the legitimacy of 
the selection method.” Id. at 630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
180 Id. at 609; see also Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 172, at 88–91 
(examining the facts of Ricci against the historical and contemporary patterns of 
exclusion and discrimination against minority firefighters). 
181 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 609. 
182 Id. at 610. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 610–11. 
185 Id. at 611. 
186 Id. at 624. 
187 Id. at 627 (citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)). 
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criteria “due to reasonable doubts about their reliability can 
hardly be held to have engaged in discrimination ‘because of’ 
race,” and that an employer’s “reasonable endeavor to comply 
with the law and to ensure that qualified candidates of all races 
have a fair opportunity to compete is simply not what Congress 
meant to interdict.”188  Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg would have 
held, “[A]n employer who jettisons a selection device when its 
disproportionate racial impact becomes apparent does not violate 
Title VII’s disparate-treatment bar automatically or at all, 
subject to this key condition:  The employer must have good 
cause to believe the device would not withstand examination for 
business necessity.”189   
In Justice Ginsburg’s view, “New Haven had ample cause to 
believe its selection process was flawed and not justified by 
business necessity,” for no one disputed the existence of a prima 
facie case of disparate impact.190  She also questioned the nature 
of the city’s promotions examination and the heavy reliance on 
written tests.191  “[M]ost municipal employers do not evaluate 
their fire-officer candidates as New Haven does,” and testimony 
before the city’s civil service board indicated that alternative 
methods were more reliable and less discriminatory.192  “[T]he 
City had good cause to fear disparate-impact liability” and there 
was “no tenable explanation why the evidence of the tests’ 
multiple deficiencies does not create at least a triable issue under 
a strong-basis-in-evidence standard.”193 
As one scholar has aptly noted, the Ricci Court “revert[ed] to 
its Wards Cove days”: 
[T]he conservative majority of the Court invalidated an 
employer’s voluntary efforts to remedy the adverse impact of 
several promotion tests it had administered. . . . [T]he Court 
deemed the tests valid even though the tests had not been 
subject to any legal scrutiny and despite strong arguments that 
the tests could not be validated under existing law.194   
?
188 Id. at 625. 
189 Id. at 625–26. 
190 Id. at 632. 
191 Id. at 632–33. 
192 Id. at 634–35. 
193 Id. at 638. 
194 Selmi, supra note 147, at 298 (footnote omitted). 
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Making law again, the Ricci Court, as had the Wards Cove Court, 
imported an intentional discrimination and disparate-treatment 
analysis into disparate-impact litigation. 
In so doing, Ricci adopted and implemented an  
employee-protective—more precisely, a nonminority-employee-
protective—approach to Title VII.  This approach was so 
protective that, having announced a new strong-basis-in-evidence 
standard, the Court did not remand the case for the lower court’s 
consideration and application of the rule.195  The Court 
determined that “there is no evidence—let alone the required 
strong basis in evidence—that the tests were flawed because they 
were not job related or because other, equally valid and less 
discriminatory tests were available to the City.”196  Accordingly, 
summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs on their 
disparate-treatment claims.197 
However, the Court did not stop there: 
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a  
disparate-impact suit, then in light of our holding today it 
should be clear that the City would avoid disparate-impact 
liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not 
certified the results, it would have been subject to  
disparate-treatment liability.198 
In a post-Ricci lawsuit, an African-American firefighter sued 
New Haven, alleging that the city’s promotion examination 
violated Title VII’s disparate-impact provision.199  Vacating the 
district court’s dismissal of the action, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the action was not 
barred.200  In the Second Circuit’s view, the Court’s sentence 
stating that the city would avoid disparate-impact liability was 
dicta and “d[id] not present a holding but rather a conclusion—an 
apparent logical truth—derived from the holding” in Ricci.201  
Thus, and as a consequence of the Court’s lawmaking activities,  
 
 
 
?
195 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 631. 
196 Id. at 592 (majority opinion). 
197 Id. at 593. 
198 Id. 
199 See Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 201 (2d Cir. 2011). 
200 Id. at 203, 209. 
201 Id. at 206. 
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New Haven has to “suffer the whipsaw effect” of defending in a 
disparate-impact suit, the very same test which the city has duly 
certified pursuant to an order of the Court.202 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s disparate-impact jurisprudence is a 
prominent example of judicial lawmaking at its best or worst, 
depending on one’s perspectives and views.  The Court initially 
created the disparate-impact cause of action in Griggs and has 
repeatedly formulated and implemented legislative-like 
evidentiary rules and schemes governing the litigation and 
adjudication of such claims.  Congressional entry into the field 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, responding to Wards Cove, 
codified the disparate-impact cause of action and expressly set 
out the elements of a plaintiff’s claim, the employer’s defense 
thereto, and the parties’ respective burdens of proof.  But this 
legislative act did not deter or prevent the Court from making 
law yet again when, in Ricci, a bare majority created and applied 
a new and extrastatutory rule and held that an employer violated 
Title VII by discarding what the employer believed to be a 
disparate-impact-causing examination.  Evidently, the Court has 
not hesitated to make Title VII disparate-impact law and policy.  
Whether and how it will continue to do so in the future warrants 
ongoing scrutiny. 
 
?
202 Id. at 209. 
